But how is the person any different from a teacup? We are all the products of our genes and our experiences. If we could recreate the exact same scenario for our hypothetical office worker – same physical office, the people he interacts with behaving in the exact same way, etc – what reason do we have to suspect that his behaviour would be in any way different from the first time we ran the simulation?
Well, I should think one difference between the person and the teacup would be that the teacup is not a product of its genes, since it has none. Whether it has any experiences is also doubtful. As for "what reason do we have to suspect that [a person's] behaviour would be in any way different" if the circumstances of his action were identical to a previous and presumably free action, what reason do we have in the first place to doubt our sense of freedom? And is it indeed ever possible to precisely reproduce the circumstances of a give "choice"? And if it is impossible, might that not be because of a freedom factor? Of course, if my writing this is simply the end product of the chain causation that I am ...
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