In case you wondered …

… Maverick Philosopher: Is the Quality of Life Objectively Evaluable on Naturalism? (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)

 How can anything be objectively devalued relative to an ideal standard that is not only nonexistent but also impossible of realization? Such a standard is an axiological analog of an unperformable action. If I cannot do action A, then I cannot be morally obliged to do A and morally censured if I fail to do A. An agent cannot fairly be judged morally defective for failing to perform actions that it is impossible for him to perform. Analogously, if a thing fails to meet a standard that it is impossible for it to meet, then its failure to meet it is no ground for its objective devaluation. Merely subjective complaints about the brevity of life are understandable enough, but given the nomological impossibility of achieving extremely long life spans it is no argument against the value of our short lives that they are short.

Benatar's thesis that our loves are objectively bad whether we think so or not strikes me as arrant nonsense on the face of it, if only because — whether  Benatar likes it or not — that is for each individual to decide on the basis of a life actually lived, not merely theorized about.