A Dutch experiment involving getting people to choose the most suitable car found that they made the right decision more often if they stopped thinking, distracted themselves and then chose the car that popped into their head when they started thinking about it again.
I do this sort of thing all the time. But I'm not a terribly rational sort.
Yes, I think it quite often happens when people "sleep on" a problem or decision, doesn't it? When they wake in the morning, the solution is in their head (so long as nobody interrupts them while they are writing it down, a la Coleridge).
ReplyDeleteAlthough this sometimes happens to me too, I would not apply this type of thinking to a car. If a car popped into my head it would probably be a very unsuitable, brightly coloured silly thing. Whereas the best car is one that's safe, reliable, efficient, etc - i.e. one that needs detailed checking out before parting with the considerable cash involved. I wonder how the survey defined "most suitable" - maybe as "the one that gave the people doing the experiment the answer they wanted to find" ;-)
As a non-driver, I'd probably screw that up, too, Maxine.
ReplyDeleteThis review reminded me of David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, especially "Sect. iii. Of the Influencing Motives of the Will," which begins:
ReplyDelete"Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, it is said, is obliged to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, till it be entirely subdued, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, antient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this supposed pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been displayed to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will."
This section also contains one of DH's more famous tropes:
"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations."