... a ghost appears in the machine. If Larry and I have the same brain states and yet different experiences, where is the person who is having the experience if he is not in the brain state? The hard problem is very hard.
To think there must be a "you" inside the brain seems to me to be somewhat on the order of assuming there is a "you" in the telephone receiver. The telephone is a device that enables me to hold a conversation with someone else who is someplace else. Neither of us is in the receiver. Perhaps the brain - perhaps the body - is a communications device, both receiver and transmitter, and that what the scan reveals is the pattern of its activity, not the source of it. Perhaps the "you" is elsewhere.
I don't think is necessarily a mere restatement of the hard problem. To begin with, we do not experience our selves as epiphenomena of brain activity. The traditional view, going back at least to Plato has been that the body is the vehicle of the self - a selfing device, as it were.