Sunday, May 18, 2008
Well, I wonder ...
... and you may, too: Is Philosophy Relevant? (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
Once the question is raised about a subject's relevance, you know it's in trouble to some extent. I think this is one of those cases where the question needs to be put more precisely: Is academic philosophy relevant? My reflexive answer would be that it never has been relevant, that turning philosophy into an academic discipline defeats its purpose, which has to do - or so I think - with finding a why for living. All sorts of things are not necessarily improved by being turned into courses. Literature, for example. Though please do not misunderstand: As I have made plain here a number of times, my life was enriched by encounters with great teachers. But what made those tachers great was that they never lost sight of the connection between the subjects they were teaching and life.
Maxine alerts us ...
... to O Lucky Man! on DVD.
I haven;t seen the film since it came it, but I remember liking it (and Britannia Hospital), which may surprise some people. At any rate, here's the opening:
I haven;t seen the film since it came it, but I remember liking it (and Britannia Hospital), which may surprise some people. At any rate, here's the opening:
A very good question ...
... Why is Alexandre Dumas better known and more reverently recalled than Rafael Sabatini?
Sabatini's Perfect Hero. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
The film of Scaramouche, with Stewart Granger in the title role and Mel Ferrer as th villain, boasts, I believe, the longest sword fight on screen. It's a good flick.
Sabatini's Perfect Hero. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
The film of Scaramouche, with Stewart Granger in the title role and Mel Ferrer as th villain, boasts, I believe, the longest sword fight on screen. It's a good flick.
The eyes have it ...
... Debunking the neuromythology; deepening the mystery.
... if being seen by someone as an object is disconcerting in various degrees, the rare instances when someone else sees us as a subject is tremendous. This is why the look of our mother or lover can make us suddenly feel at home in the world: as Iris Murdoch put it, love is the painful realisation that other people, other subjects, exist. When we experience such love our self-consciousness as subjects is affirmed.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
Forget hair color ...
... and complexion, but do take notice of the one who laughs "without laughter ... a sad person, who feigns joy but is not joyful." The philosophy of physiognomy.
Message and messenger ...
... Well Maybe I Just Owe Someone an Apology.
When Albert Jay Nock was the editor of The Freeman, he made a point, whenever a contributor was especially well known, to not draw special attention to said contributor's byline. So George Bernard Shaw's byline would be simply George B. Shaw. Nock thought the article should be judged by what it said, not by the celebrity of its author.
Those who insist that reviews be written by "name" or "credentialed" reviewers would of course disagree.
Those who insist that reviews be written by "name" or "credentialed" reviewers would of course disagree.
Another good question ...
... Whatever Happened to the Gentleman? (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
I was telling Nigel Beale at lunch today that the nuns who taught me as a child - the Religious of the Sacred Heart - tended to explain Catholic moral teaching in terms of good manners. That is probably why it stuck - and without the kind of guilt I hear others complain of. It's one thing to be told that if you do such-and-such you will be committing a sin. It's quite another to be told that if you do that sort of thing you will be a boor.
A sad decline ...
... David Marr on Patrick White.
Apparently, interest in White's fiction has waned. Too bad, he is a beautiful writer. I reviewed Marr's biography and his collection White's letters. Of the former, I wrote that it was a model of its kind, exhaustive without becoming exhausting, bringing into vivid focus every character and detail. His readings of White's works are noticeably insightful and he makes clear how White's experiences were made use of in his fiction without reducing the latter to querulous autobiography. White read the book shortly before his death in 1990. He did not request a single cut or change, but confessed he could read much of it only through tears."
Apparently, interest in White's fiction has waned. Too bad, he is a beautiful writer. I reviewed Marr's biography and his collection White's letters. Of the former, I wrote that it was a model of its kind, exhaustive without becoming exhausting, bringing into vivid focus every character and detail. His readings of White's works are noticeably insightful and he makes clear how White's experiences were made use of in his fiction without reducing the latter to querulous autobiography. White read the book shortly before his death in 1990. He did not request a single cut or change, but confessed he could read much of it only through tears."
Friday, May 16, 2008
More on Brooks ...
... and neural Buddhism: Brooks and the Fallacy of the Misplaced Concrete. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
"In a society that has rejected the historical function of texts and myth, people begin to confuse the possession of a discreet object (a “book,” a “diploma,” or “faith”) with the accomplishment and public esteem they really desire."
Good point.
Good point.
Don't worry ...
... be happy: ... be happy: Thoughts on happiness research and the nature of unhappiness. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
"Me, I want to believe whatever is true even if that makes me unhappy. And with that attitude, I doubt attending church would make me happier."
"Me, I want to believe whatever is true even if that makes me unhappy. And with that attitude, I doubt attending church would make me happier."
Actually, it doesn't follow that, because going to church makes A happy, going to church will make B - or anyone else - happy. Another falsely converted proposition. In fact, people attend church because they think something connected with going to church is true. They don't think something connected with church is true because they attend church.
Also, having a want satisfied tends to give some degree of pleasure, which is attendant to happiness. So, one should be happy to the extent that the desire for truth is satisfied, if truth is what one wants, and even if the truth in question is not of itself conducive to happiness.
Also, having a want satisfied tends to give some degree of pleasure, which is attendant to happiness. So, one should be happy to the extent that the desire for truth is satisfied, if truth is what one wants, and even if the truth in question is not of itself conducive to happiness.
This has garnered much comment ...
... so why shouldn't I weigh in as well? The Neural Buddhists.
First, just because you can map what goes on in the brain - or throughout the body - while you are having an experience doesn't actually say all that much about the experience. If you come running at me screaming while wielding an ax, I will have a rush of adrenalin and all sorts of synapses will go off throughout my nervous system. I still better take cover.
"The cognitive revolution is not going to end up undermining faith in God, it’s going to end up challenging faith in the Bible." Depends on the nature of your faith in the Bible.
"The real challenge is going to come from people who feel the existence of the sacred, but who think that particular religions are just cultural artifacts built on top of universal human traits. ... Orthodox believers are going to have to defend particular doctrines and particular biblical teachings. They’re going to have to defend the idea of a personal God, and explain why specific theologies are true guides for behavior day to day."
Good points, but good theologians have been doing those things for quite some time. Actually, to establish that experiences of the sacred are a experience of the real - and a part of such experiences is their personal dimension, the experience of an Other - should make it easier to resolve differences over terminology and doctrine.
First, just because you can map what goes on in the brain - or throughout the body - while you are having an experience doesn't actually say all that much about the experience. If you come running at me screaming while wielding an ax, I will have a rush of adrenalin and all sorts of synapses will go off throughout my nervous system. I still better take cover.
"The cognitive revolution is not going to end up undermining faith in God, it’s going to end up challenging faith in the Bible." Depends on the nature of your faith in the Bible.
"The real challenge is going to come from people who feel the existence of the sacred, but who think that particular religions are just cultural artifacts built on top of universal human traits. ... Orthodox believers are going to have to defend particular doctrines and particular biblical teachings. They’re going to have to defend the idea of a personal God, and explain why specific theologies are true guides for behavior day to day."
Good points, but good theologians have been doing those things for quite some time. Actually, to establish that experiences of the sacred are a experience of the real - and a part of such experiences is their personal dimension, the experience of an Other - should make it easier to resolve differences over terminology and doctrine.
Another meeting of note ...
... on this date in 2008 - today, in other words, Frank Wilson and Nigel Beale met in South Philadelphia for lunch. I had a splendid time.
A date to remember ...
... Patrick Kurp writes to tell me that "Samuel Johnson and James Boswell first met on
Monday, May 16, 1763, at Tom Davies' bookshop, Russell Street, London. "
Monday, May 16, 1763, at Tom Davies' bookshop, Russell Street, London. "
Kant lite ...
... Can and Kant, in which the Sage of Königsberg laboriously descants on the axiom that you cannot argue from non-existence to non-possibility.
No dud this ...
... Elaine Dundy, who died on May 1, is best known for her novel The Dud Avocado. But she also wrote Elvis and Gladys, which the TLS reviewed on May 24, 1985: Then and Now. Prospective biographers of anyone could learn a lot from this.
Thursday, May 15, 2008
If anything goes ...
... well, don't be surprised at the result: Mr. Sammler’s City. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
His fictitious nonfiction ...
... was apparently better: James Frey’s Cosmopolis of Lies. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
This about nails it ...
... Informed Opinions. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
What the litblogosphere promises to offer is the possibility of multiple sources of well-supported reviews and commentary (many more than have been available in print publications, whose numbers are only continuing to decline, anyway), which can only enrich the discussion of current fiction (and poetry) and in turn encourage writers to believe their work is getting serious attention. Those who have criticized the litblogosphere precisely for the abundance of opinions on display have decried the loss of "authority" it thereby produces. But critical authority comes not from having your name in print in some putatively prestigious newspaper or magazine but from the care that has been taken to support an opinion with astute observation.
Exactly.
Exactly.
The appeal of Saki ...
... Christopher Hitchens on Where the Wild Things Are. (Hat tip, Paul Davis.)
A good time, I think ...
... for one of Elberry's tonic rants: the vice of ignorance.
I must say I do find this incredible:
Theodore Dalrymple, having drawn his knowledge of humanity from his work as a psychiatrist in a prison and an inner city hospital, writes of a posh literary dinner:
I must say I do find this incredible:
Theodore Dalrymple, having drawn his knowledge of humanity from his work as a psychiatrist in a prison and an inner city hospital, writes of a posh literary dinner:
On my right sat a man in his late sixties, intelligent and cultivated, who had been a distinguished foreign correspondent for the BBC and who had spent much of his career in the United States. He said that for the last ten years he had read with interest my weekly dispatches—printed in a rival, conservative publication—depicting the spiritual, cultural, emotional, and moral chaos of modern urban life, and had always wanted to meet me to ask me a simple question: Did I make it all up?
Get ready ...
... for the Philadelphia Book Festival.
There's this, too: Walters' career a continuing audition.
Details here: Philadelphia Book Festival.
There's this, too: Walters' career a continuing audition.
Details here: Philadelphia Book Festival.
Nige on ...
... The Einstein Letter.
Readers may recall that my own link to think was titled "So what?" Nige and I really do think alike most of the time.
Readers may recall that my own link to think was titled "So what?" Nige and I really do think alike most of the time.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Oddly ...
... I don't find these funny at all. I find them appalling. Thank God that's over: How to handle a woman.
Maxine rounds up ...
... some Books off the beaten track. including one reviewed by yours truly. Thank you, my dear.
Come again?
... Distribution of the Double Linkings in Irone.
THE formulation of Irene as 1: 1: 2: 6-tetra-methyltetralin has recently been established synthetically by Bogert and Apfelbaum. On the basis of this formulation of irene and the production of ββγ-trimethyl pimelic acid by ozonization of irone, structural formulæ have been postulated for this ketone by Ruzicka and his co-workers. Two of the postulated structures contain the chromophoric system C = C – C = C – C = O which should therefore give rise to a characteristic absorption spectrum.
I couldn't have put it better myself.
THE formulation of Irene as 1: 1: 2: 6-tetra-methyltetralin has recently been established synthetically by Bogert and Apfelbaum. On the basis of this formulation of irene and the production of ββγ-trimethyl pimelic acid by ozonization of irone, structural formulæ have been postulated for this ketone by Ruzicka and his co-workers. Two of the postulated structures contain the chromophoric system C = C – C = C – C = O which should therefore give rise to a characteristic absorption spectrum.
I couldn't have put it better myself.
In case you wondered ...
... Our Middle Name (theirs, not ours.) (Hat tip, Jim Carmin.)
One of my all-time favorite novel titles is The Man Who Road Ampersand.
One of my all-time favorite novel titles is The Man Who Road Ampersand.
Down memory lane ...
... the Esquire cover gallery. (Hat tip, Jim Carmin.)
Check out some of those '50s covers - of issues featuring Breakfast at Tiffany's and Sweet Bird of Youth. Yeah, sure, the '50s really were a benighted time.
Check out some of those '50s covers - of issues featuring Breakfast at Tiffany's and Sweet Bird of Youth. Yeah, sure, the '50s really were a benighted time.
The Marcus Aurelius ...
... of Tinseltown: Mamet's Jiu-Jitsu Isn't Just Verbal.
By the way, Gordo really does know his boxing.
By the way, Gordo really does know his boxing.
A professional look ...
... at ontological reductionism: Against Buddhist Reductionism: Call for Comments. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
This suggests, I am happy to note, that - in my clumsy, non-professional way - I seem to have got some things right in yesterday's Ontological potage.
This suggests, I am happy to note, that - in my clumsy, non-professional way - I seem to have got some things right in yesterday's Ontological potage.
Changing times ...
... The future of poetry magazines. (Hat tip, Rus Bowden, who writes that "
It taps into my thinking that with the internet we may no longer want to submit to print, unless it is a project that our work belongs in. Otherwise, why wouldn't our own web sites, as attractive or poorly done as they are in design and content, go a long way to usurp the role of the periodicals?"
I think he's right.)
It taps into my thinking that with the internet we may no longer want to submit to print, unless it is a project that our work belongs in. Otherwise, why wouldn't our own web sites, as attractive or poorly done as they are in design and content, go a long way to usurp the role of the periodicals?"
I think he's right.)
Manifestations of God ...
... would be, I think. Is God a Black Swan?: Part 1, Black Swans and the Triplet of Opacity. (Hat tip, Dave Lull.)
I must visit this site more often.
I must visit this site more often.
Nige on target ...
... as usual: Art, etc.
Nige asks: "The forthcoming movie of Brideshead Revisited - do we need this? The fondly remembered TV series was actually turgid stuff, far too long and literal. Come to that, is the book that good?"
I suspect we won't need the movie, if only because novels are best made into mini-series. As to whether the series was all that good, I managde somehow not to see it, so I can't say. Maybe I'll check it out.
The novel, I think, is wonderful, but I am not bothered - as many English readers seem to be (though not Pundy) - by what is a taken to be its focus on class. I didn't even notice it. At the time I first read it, it struck me as perhaps the saddest book I had ever read and that its sadness was the sadness that comes from being human.
Nige asks: "The forthcoming movie of Brideshead Revisited - do we need this? The fondly remembered TV series was actually turgid stuff, far too long and literal. Come to that, is the book that good?"
I suspect we won't need the movie, if only because novels are best made into mini-series. As to whether the series was all that good, I managde somehow not to see it, so I can't say. Maybe I'll check it out.
The novel, I think, is wonderful, but I am not bothered - as many English readers seem to be (though not Pundy) - by what is a taken to be its focus on class. I didn't even notice it. At the time I first read it, it struck me as perhaps the saddest book I had ever read and that its sadness was the sadness that comes from being human.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
So what ...
... Einstein letter calls Bible ‘pretty childish’. (Hat tip, Roger Miller.)
Actually, there is much in what the old boy says in this letter, but Einstein was fundamentally a Spinozist.
Actually, there is much in what the old boy says in this letter, but Einstein was fundamentally a Spinozist.
Misplaced loyalty ...
... Cult of Personality.
Aimee Semple McPherson was the model for Sharon Falconer in Sinclair Lewis's Elmer Gantry and and also the character Eli Watkins in Upton's Sinclair's Oil.
Aimee Semple McPherson was the model for Sharon Falconer in Sinclair Lewis's Elmer Gantry and and also the character Eli Watkins in Upton's Sinclair's Oil.
Ontological potage ...
Dave Lull recently drew my attention to this post by Gordon McCabe, in which Gordon comments on Stuart Kauffman's article "Breaking the Galilean Spell," which I linked to in this post of mine.
According to Gordon, Kauffman "fails to distinguish between ontological reductionism and epistemological reductionism," the difference being that the former "merely proposes that the parts of a system, and the way in which those parts are organised and interact, uniquely determine the higher-level states and properties of the system," while the latter "proposes that we can always explain and predict the higher-level states and properties of a system from the parts of the system and the way in which those parts are organised and interact."
In particular, though, "ontological reductionism proposes that what ultimately exists are the objects studied in physics, whether they be particles and forces, or whatever," in contrast to epistemological reductionism, which "proposes that the theories and laws of any branch of science are derivable from those of physics."
"Epistemological reductionism is false," Gordon says, because of "conceptual differences between theories, and simple limitations in the tractability of equations when dealing with systems containing billions of particles." But "this is consistent," Gordon says, "with the truth of ontological reductionism."
I confess I find some of this perplexing. As Gordon reminds us at the outset, "Ontology pertains to what actually exists and happens, epistemology pertains to what we know, or can know, about what exists and happens." That being the case, doesn't it follow that ontological propositions are subject to epistemological scrutiny, including the proposition that "ontological reductionism is true"?
Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that it is true, that "what ultimately exists are the objects studied in physics," would it not follow that "the theories and laws ... derivable from physics" are the only theories and laws that validly pertain to what ultimately exists? And would that not constitute an epistemological reductionism corollary to ontological reductionism? And might that not be what Kauffman is objecting to?
This brings me to what Gordon's post initially got me thinking about: Bach's B-minor Mass and Tuscan white bean soup.
Last Friday, I made a sort of Tuscan white bean soup. I say " a sort of" because, while I like to look at recipes - and have been to Tuscany and eaten the genuine article - I am not given to following them too precisely. I regard them the way a musician regards a score, as something to which you must bring knowledge, experience, skill and taste - and make your own. No soup - nor any performance of a piece of music - should ever be quite the same twice. So, like any sound cook - and I learned to cook from my mother and grandmother - I rarely use measuring cups and spoons. I use my eye, my fingers, the palm of my hand, the feel of the soup as I stir it, and - of course - my nose and my tongue. I know exactly what Eugene Ormandy meant when he said that the Philadelphia sound "is me." This wasn't egoism. It was simply a matter of fact. I could say the same about the flavor of my white bean soup.
Anyway, while I was making the soup, I kept thinking, from time to time, about Gordon's post. One thought I had was that one problem with ontological reductionism was that it reduced everything to ingredients. I suspect that a physical analysis of my soup and of another employing the same ingredients would come out much the same - but that the two soups might well not taste at all the same. And there's where Bach's B-minor Mass came in. The pure physics of the B-minor Mass can't be all that different - if at all different - from, say, Mozart's C-minor Mass (or, for that matter, any other choral-instrumental work). Yet there is, in fact, a world of difference between the two (and between those and all the others).
There is also another problem - for me - with ontological reductionism, namely, that it grants ultimate reality only to the elementary constituents of reality. This seems to me to be a variation on the idea that the most genuine form of something is its initial form, that the point of departure is somehow more fundamentally real than the destination - which is obviously absurd.
The Schoolmen defined the essence of a thing as that which makes it what it is. But what makes a particular thing what it is in particular is precisely what it does not have in common with anything else. I do not experience myself in terms of genes, biochemical processes, or wave and particle interactions, and I would submit that my experience of myself serves as a direct connection to ultimate reality, whatever that may be.
The ultimate reality of Michelangelo's David is not the marble from which it was carved, but the statue itself. And the ultimate reality of my bean soup is the soup. The ultimate reality of anything is not what it is made from, but what it is. Our point of entry to ultimate reality is located right where we encounter it most immediately, not eons ago or deep within the atom. Therein lies the problem with reductionism, whether it be epistemological or ontological.
In particular, though, "ontological reductionism proposes that what ultimately exists are the objects studied in physics, whether they be particles and forces, or whatever," in contrast to epistemological reductionism, which "proposes that the theories and laws of any branch of science are derivable from those of physics."
"Epistemological reductionism is false," Gordon says, because of "conceptual differences between theories, and simple limitations in the tractability of equations when dealing with systems containing billions of particles." But "this is consistent," Gordon says, "with the truth of ontological reductionism."
I confess I find some of this perplexing. As Gordon reminds us at the outset, "Ontology pertains to what actually exists and happens, epistemology pertains to what we know, or can know, about what exists and happens." That being the case, doesn't it follow that ontological propositions are subject to epistemological scrutiny, including the proposition that "ontological reductionism is true"?
Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that it is true, that "what ultimately exists are the objects studied in physics," would it not follow that "the theories and laws ... derivable from physics" are the only theories and laws that validly pertain to what ultimately exists? And would that not constitute an epistemological reductionism corollary to ontological reductionism? And might that not be what Kauffman is objecting to?
This brings me to what Gordon's post initially got me thinking about: Bach's B-minor Mass and Tuscan white bean soup.
Last Friday, I made a sort of Tuscan white bean soup. I say " a sort of" because, while I like to look at recipes - and have been to Tuscany and eaten the genuine article - I am not given to following them too precisely. I regard them the way a musician regards a score, as something to which you must bring knowledge, experience, skill and taste - and make your own. No soup - nor any performance of a piece of music - should ever be quite the same twice. So, like any sound cook - and I learned to cook from my mother and grandmother - I rarely use measuring cups and spoons. I use my eye, my fingers, the palm of my hand, the feel of the soup as I stir it, and - of course - my nose and my tongue. I know exactly what Eugene Ormandy meant when he said that the Philadelphia sound "is me." This wasn't egoism. It was simply a matter of fact. I could say the same about the flavor of my white bean soup.
Anyway, while I was making the soup, I kept thinking, from time to time, about Gordon's post. One thought I had was that one problem with ontological reductionism was that it reduced everything to ingredients. I suspect that a physical analysis of my soup and of another employing the same ingredients would come out much the same - but that the two soups might well not taste at all the same. And there's where Bach's B-minor Mass came in. The pure physics of the B-minor Mass can't be all that different - if at all different - from, say, Mozart's C-minor Mass (or, for that matter, any other choral-instrumental work). Yet there is, in fact, a world of difference between the two (and between those and all the others).
There is also another problem - for me - with ontological reductionism, namely, that it grants ultimate reality only to the elementary constituents of reality. This seems to me to be a variation on the idea that the most genuine form of something is its initial form, that the point of departure is somehow more fundamentally real than the destination - which is obviously absurd.
The Schoolmen defined the essence of a thing as that which makes it what it is. But what makes a particular thing what it is in particular is precisely what it does not have in common with anything else. I do not experience myself in terms of genes, biochemical processes, or wave and particle interactions, and I would submit that my experience of myself serves as a direct connection to ultimate reality, whatever that may be.
The ultimate reality of Michelangelo's David is not the marble from which it was carved, but the statue itself. And the ultimate reality of my bean soup is the soup. The ultimate reality of anything is not what it is made from, but what it is. Our point of entry to ultimate reality is located right where we encounter it most immediately, not eons ago or deep within the atom. Therein lies the problem with reductionism, whether it be epistemological or ontological.
Once again ...
... Nige is onto something :Too Many People?
Given that there are those among environmentalists who think that nothing is wrong with Earth that the elimination of our species would not permanently improve, perhaps they should rethink their views of capitalism and consumerism.
Given that there are those among environmentalists who think that nothing is wrong with Earth that the elimination of our species would not permanently improve, perhaps they should rethink their views of capitalism and consumerism.
LIke father, like son ...
... Peter Leonard follows dad Elmore's example with a gritty Michigan novel. (Hat tip, Paul Davis.)
Extry, extry ...
... read all about it. And this really is news. Jeff Sypek emails me that "a few months ago, the New Orleans Times Picayune started devoting its entire Wednesday "Living" section to books and book-related news," and he sends along this link to BOOKS NEWS AND REVIEWS.
Jeff also notes approvingly that special emphasis is placed on New Orleans authors. It is useful to remind people that not all authors live in Manhattan.
Jeff also notes approvingly that special emphasis is placed on New Orleans authors. It is useful to remind people that not all authors live in Manhattan.
Monday, May 12, 2008
Blogging will resume later ...
... probably sometime tomorrow. Debbie is taking off for Greece in a few days, and various things need to be done.
This is very interesting ...
... to me at any rate. I used to live near the Wissahickon and have walked through it from end to end countless times. George and the Wissahickon.
I was sorry not to be able to make Ed's talk. Too many other commitments.
I was sorry not to be able to make Ed's talk. Too many other commitments.
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